Candidates must make sure that all Americans count,
by making
sure that all votes are counted.
It is time to put the sanctity of citizens’ votes
above the desires of any candidate or party. Your
responsibility as
a candidate in a democratic election is to make certain
that the election was fair and that all votes are counted
accurately.
To: All Indiana Democratic and Republican Party County
Chairs (1)
Regarding: Are you prepared to verify the vote in the upcoming
election?
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Verify the Vote - Indiana is a non-partisan
organization working for legislation that
will require the use of voter-verified paper
ballots and automatic post-election audits
for all Indiana counties. We hope that post-election
audits, in future, will consist of randomly
selecting a small number of precincts from
each county and hand-counting the voter-verified
paper ballots cast in those precincts to
determine whether the electronic voting system
counted and tallied the votes correctly.
(2)
Important: The fact that we advocate post-election
audits should not be taken as criticism
of our experienced, professional, honest
Indiana
County Clerks.
We have spoken with members of the Boards of Election in three Indiana
counties, and the more we learn about the
complexity of conducting elections, the
more
we respect the County Clerks and the members of the Boards of Election.
Errors can and do, however, occur in any
human enterprise. Computerized voting system
problems can occur as a result of an error in the software program provided
by the vendor; an error when the election is set up on the county computer;
an error in the instructions provided to voters; an error when results
from
the voting machines are transferred to the central tabulator computer that
adds up all of the votes; or an error in how the system tallies the votes.
We believe in a slight variation on President Ronald Reagan’s sage
advice - we believe that citizens should “Trust and verify” our
democratic elections. At present, there is no Indiana law that requires automatic
audits of elections – so the only option available to citizens and
candidates to double-check that the reported election results are accurate
is recounts.
Our understanding of Indiana election law is that candidates may request
a recount if they have a good-faith belief that the election result as reported
could be wrong. (3) It is the opinion of Verify the Vote – Indiana that
the only valid reason for a candidate to request a recount is to ascertain
the will of Indiana voters. A recount should never be requested for a frivolous
reason. Further, recounts should never be requested as a “strategic
move” - as an attempt to count the votes in a way that benefits a
particular candidate or party.
Why are we issuing this letter? In a recent Indiana election, a candidate
who had requested a recount was not informed about all of his options for
a recount on the voting system in question, and did not know the right questions
to ask. We want all candidates to know more about the questions they can
and should ask.
Also, we find that there is profound misunderstanding
about the types of errors that can occur
on computerized voting systems. In the
past, recounts
have been limited to races in which there was a narrow margin between the “winner” and “loser,” which
made sense when paper ballots were hand-counted. On electronic voting systems,
however, one error in a computer program is multiplied by the total number
of voters who use that program, and recounts may reverse the election result
even when there is a large gap between vote totals. For example, in the May
2006 Primary Election for County Recorder in Pottawotamie County, Iowa, an
initial machine count indicated that candidate Duran had received 55% of
the votes to candidate Sciortino’s 44%. Not worth a recount? When
County Auditor Marilyn Jo Drake hand-counted the same set of optical scan
ballots,
candidate Sciortino had received 85% of the votes cast, while candidate
Duran had only 14%. At this point Drake stopped the machine count, called
the Secretary
of State's office, and talked to her county Board of Supervisors requesting
permission to hand-count all of the county's ballots. The state and county
gave Drake permission to do the hand-count, it was carried out the day
after the election, and candidate Sciortino won handily. (4) The same problems
that can occur with optical scan voting systems can also occur in direct-record
electronic voting systems!
Because of this potential for small errors to have large results, we believe
that questionable election results should trigger a recount.
Our advice to Indiana County Chairs - work
with your County Clerk, Board of Elections,
candidates, and with the voting machine
vendors to be fully
informed about your options for requesting and conducting recounts. We
recently spoke with Steve Shamo of Microvote,
who told us that he recommends that
candidates contact his company directly to determine their options. We
hope that other voting machine vendors – such as ES&S,
Diebold/Fidlar, and Voting Technologies International
feel similarly.
Recount basics: If your county uses an optical
scan ballot system, then you can perform a complete recount of
those ballots. If your county uses a direct-record electronic
system, you can still perform a meaningful audit (even though
you can never be guaranteed that the voting machines recorded
the votes as the voters intended).
Ask questions about ballot & machine security.
Be sure to double-check procedures for handling optical scan
ballots: each ballot should be visually inspected to make sure
that it
is
not
unreadable by the scanner because it has been marred
by over-votes, by marks that are too light, by erasures, or by
stray marks
-- or because it has been folded or crumpled. If a ballot
is found to be unreadable by the machine for any of these reasons,
a
bipartisan
team should create a new ballot that represents the intent
of the voter so that this ballot can be scanned.
To prepare for the possibility of a recount, petition
your County Clerk and/or the Indiana Secretary of State’s
Office for detailed, written information about recounts on your
particular
voting system in advance of the election (if possible).
• Ask for clarification: Under exactly what circumstances can a recount
be requested? By whom can a recount be requested – by any candidate,
by citizens?
• What are all of the time limits on requests for audits and recounts?
Do the time limits differ for various auditing/recounting options? When are
the voting machine memory banks erased? When is the ballot file used to count
votes
in this election cleared from the machine?
• When a request for audit/recount is submitted to the Clerk, how long
will it take for the action to begin? How long will it take to complete?
• Exactly what auditing and recounting operations are possible on the particular
voting system(s) used in your county? Your county may use one or more of the
following systems:
If your county uses a central-count
optical scan voting system: A central
count optical scan system is one in which
at least one optical scan reader is kept
in the Clerk’s Office and ballots are
brought to the office to be counted. First,
determine all of the paper trails that can
be produced by the system. Central-count
optical scan voting systems should generate
a report showing that there were zero votes
on the system at the beginning of the scanning
session and the total number of votes cast
for each precinct after all ballots are scanned.
Some optical scan voting systems store an
image (a picture) of each voter’s ballot – does
yours? Some optical scan voting systems have
several ‘memory banks’ that store
votes cast. All optical scan systems should
generate “audit logs” that
show the date/time of all activities on
the voting
system during the election. Keep in mind
that with any optical scan voting system
you can randomly select precincts and hand-count
the ballots in those precincts to make
sure that the tallies reported by the central
tabulator are accurate. (5) If the hand-count
and central tabulator counts disagree,
then
a hand-count of all optical scan ballots
cast in your county should be conducted.
Talk with your County Clerk and consult
the voting system vendor for complete information
about your system!
If your county uses a precinct-count
optical scan voting system: A precinct-count
optical scan system is one in which there
is at least one optical scan reader at
each precinct. At the end of election day,
results
from each optical scan reader must be transferred
to the central tabulator PC that adds up
all of the votes at the Clerk’s Office.
The results from each reader are usually
transferred via a cartridge or memory card
to the central tabulator PC. First, determine
all of the paper trails that can be produced
by the system. Most precinct-count optical
scan voting systems will print a summary
tape at the end of election day showing all
of the votes cast in that precinct – each
summary tape should have a printed statement
at the top that there were zero votes on
the machine at the start of election day.
You should inspect the summary tapes and
request that the vote totals on some/all
of the summary tapes be added by hand to
double-check that the tabulator totals are
accurate. Some optical scan voting systems
store an image (a picture) of each voter’s
ballot – does yours? Some optical scan
voting systems have several “memory
banks” that store votes cast, can the
memory banks be accessed independently – in
a way other than simply printing summary
tapes a second time? ALL optical scan systems
should generate “audit logs” that
have date/time stamp for all activities on
the voting system during the election. For
precinct-count optical scan systems that
there are two phases of vote capture and
vote counting: The optical scan readers at
each precinct and the central tabulator PC
at the Clerk’s office. You should
inspect audit logs for the readers and
the central
tabulator in a recount. Keep in mind, also,
that with any optical scan voting system
you can randomly select precincts and hand-count
the ballots in those precincts to make
sure that the tallies reported by the central
tabulator are accurate. (5) If the hand-count
and central tabulator counts disagree,
then
a hand-count of all optical scan ballots
cast in your county should be conducted.
Talk with your County Clerk and consult
the voting system vendor for complete information
about your system!
If your county uses direct-record
electronic voting machines: First,
determine all of the paper trails that
can be produced by the system. Each voting
machine
should print a summary tape at the end
of election day showing the votes cast on that
machine – each summary tape should
have a printed statement at the top that
there were zero votes on the machine at the
start of election day. In some counties,
precinct workers are asked to create a ‘precinct
tally sheet’ that shows the votes cast
on all of the machines in that precinct and
the total number of votes for all machines
combined. Some direct-record electronic voting
machines – like the Microvote 464s – print
an internal audit tape as voters cast their
ballots during election day. Some direct-record
electronic voting machines have several ‘memory
banks’ that store votes cast. Can the
memory banks be accessed independently – in
a way other than simply printing summary
tapes a second time? ALL direct-record electronic
voting systems should generate ‘audit
logs’ that have date/time stamp for
all activities on the voting system during
the election. Keep in mind, for direct-record
voting machine systems, that there are two
phases of vote capture & vote counting:
information from the voting machines at each
precinct must be transferred to the central
tabulator PC that adds up all of the votes
at the Clerk’s office. You should
inspect audit logs for the readers and
the central
tabulator in a recount. You should inspect
the summary tapes and request that the
vote totals on some/all of the summary
tapes be
added by hand to double-check that the
tabulator totals are accurate. Unfortunately, direct-record
electronic voting machines in Indiana do
not produce voter-verified paper ballots,
so you cannot be sure that the voting machine
captured each vote as the voter intended.
You can, however, request thorough post-election
testing of the voting machines in your county.
(Post-election testing should be as thorough
as an excellent pre-election test. 6) Talk
with your County Clerk and consult the voting
system vendor for complete information about
your system!
Finally, prepare yourself and all citizens – you will not concede until
you are confident that all votes have been counted and the tallies are accurate.
Once a candidate concedes, the press and citizens will begin to perceive
that person as the loser. Campaign post-mortems will begin, fingers will
be pointed and little attention may be paid to provisional, spoiled, and
absentee ballots. Some citizens will conclude that their negative experience
was just an oddity and won’t report it. People who have specific knowledge
about problems with the election will shrug and walk away. The 2004 Harvard
Kennedy School of Government symposium on “Voting, Vote Capture & Vote
Counting” says this: “Speed and accuracy in determining the official
tally are both achievable, but not simultaneously possible. Provisional ballots
may need to be evaluated and added, and the process should be assessed after
the fact for irregularities (including disenfranchisement, voter misinformation
or intimidation). Audits should take place soon after the election, and should
be comprehensive. The unofficial returns may be released soon after the election;
but time should be taken with the official tallies. There is no way to get
a guaranteed fast tally, which is a count that is accurate as fast as possible.
The public must understand that every vote counts, and every vote should
be counted. Promises or expectations of quick resolutions should be avoided,
and the media (and political parties) must not overly stress preliminary
counts.” (7)
What is the cost involved in verifying election results? Our understanding
of Indiana Election Law is that a petitioner for a recount must post a bond
for at least $100 to recount the first 10 precincts. The cost of a more extensive
recount depends on the election returns. If, on the face of the election
returns, the difference between the number of votes cast for the candidate
nominated or elected and the petitioner is not more than 1% of the total
votes cast for all candidates then the amount of deposit or bond is increased
by $10 for each precinct in excess of ten. If, however, on the face of the
election returns, the difference between votes cast for the candidate nominated
or elected and the petitioner is more than one percent (1%) the amount of
the deposit or bond shall be increased by one hundred dollars ($100) for
each precinct in excess of ten. (8)
Again, we would like to emphasize that it is the opinion of Verify the
Vote – Indiana that the only valid reason for a candidate to request
a recount is to ascertain the will of Indiana voters. Recounts should never
be requested for a frivolous reason or as a strategic move to benefit a candidate
or party.
We believe that inherent in the right of citizens to cast their
votes is a right to have those votes counted accurately. Voter
confidence across the nation continues to drop. We urge candidates,
parties, election officials and volunteers to act with the highest
standards of integrity in the upcoming election and we urge you
to verify the vote.
Sincerely, for Verify the Vote – Indiana,
James Allison
Tomi Allison
William Berling
Susan Davis
Cynthia Hoffman
Carole Scifres
Joanne Shank
Janet Cedar Spring
Gene Stoll
Rae Stoll
Contact us
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1. We are sending this letter to all Democratic Party and Republican Party
Chairs whose email addresses we can find on the Indiana State party websites.
We are making an effort to place a phone call to those chairs who are not
listed so we can send the letter via email or snail mail. We will also send
this letter to State Chairs of the Libertarian, Constitution, and Green parties.
2. Random Auditing of E-Voting Systems: How Much is Enough? by Howard Stanislevic.
http://www.votetrustusa.org/pdfs/VTTF/EVEPAuditing.pdf
3. No statement in this document should be construed as legal advice.
Consult a lawyer!
4. “Too Much, Too Fast, More Than They Can Chew” by
John Gideon
http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1378&Itemid=51
5. Random Auditing of E-Voting Systems: How Much is Enough? by
Howard Stanislevic.
http://www.votetrustusa.org/pdfs/VTTF/EVEPAuditing.pdf
6. Guidelines for Creating a Test Deck of Ballots by John Washburn,
Certified Software Engineer.
http://www.washburnresearch.org/archive/TestingGuidelines/GuidelinesForCreatingTestBallots.pdf
7. Indiana Election Code on recounts:
http://www.in.gov/legislative/ic/code/title3/ar12/ch6.html
8. The Voting, Vote Capture, and Vote Counting Symposium. June
1, 2004, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. http://designforvalues.org/voting/
Extra-Credit: Petition the
Indiana Secretary of State for:
