Toward secure, accurate,
transparent elections:
I. Direct-record electronic voting systems cannot be secured
Machinery of Democracy:
Protecting Elections in an Electronic World Executive
Summary (PDF) -or- Full
Report (PDF).
Brennan Justice Center,
2006
Federal
Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting
Systems are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed (PDF)
US GAO (September 2005)
Voter-Verified
Paper Record Issues (Draft, 11/20/2006). (PDF)
John P. Wack, National Institute of Standards and Technology
recommends decertifying DRE voting systems that do not produce
a VVPB. They encourage a move toward systems that are "software
independent" and appear to indicate a preference for optical
scan paper ballots over DREs
with VVPBs.
Voting,
Vote Capture & Vote Counting Symposium at Kennedy
School of Government (PDF) Summary by Jean Camp, PhD (2004)
Ars
Technica “How to steal an election by hacking the vote” (PDF)
or online
II. National & State Legislation
HR550
- Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2005. (PDF) National legislation sponsored by Congressmember Rush Holt
requiring a voter-verified permanent paper record and post-election
audits.
HR550
Lobbying Packet (PDF)
From “Verified Voting” – David Dill’s
Stanford Group in support of HR550.
2007 Federal
Election Reform Legislation (PDF)
Recommendations from VotersUnite! for amending HR550 before re-introducing
the legislation for 2007. In light of 2006 failures of DRE voting
machines that print voter-verified paper ballots, VoterUnite!
strongly recommends banning all DRE systems. Also: making elections
independent
of vendors.
North Carolina Verified
Voting Law 2005 (PDF)
Requiring voter-verified paper ballots and audits. Also pre-
and post-election testing of voting systems.
Verified Voting Legislation/Policy page contains links
to national legislation and laws introduced/passed in over 20
states.
III. Usability of Optical Scan Voting Systems
The Machinery of
Democracy: Usability of Voting Systems (PDF)
Brennan Justice Center, 2006.
Counting
Mark-Sense Ballots: Problems & Legal Considerations
By Douglas W. Jones of the University of Iowa
Residual Votes Attributable to
Technology (PDF)
The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project (2001) indicates that
optical scan systems have the same or lower residual vote rates
as all other
existing technologies.
Ballot
Initiatives and Residual Ballots in the 2004 Presidential Election (PDF). Tables
showing study results!
(PDF)
Kimble & Kropf, 2006
Undervote
Rates in North Carolina and Undervote
Rates in Virginia
Using Optical Scan Voting Systems:
An Interview with an Election
Administrator
Measuring
Usability of Paper Ballots: Efficiency, Effectiveness and Satisfaction. (PDF)
Everett, Byrne & Green; Rice Department of Psychology
A Comparison
of Usability Between Voting Methods (PDF)
Greene, Byrne & Everett; Rice Department of psychology
IV. Financial Impact of Transition to Optical Scan Voting System
Federal Efforts to Improve Security
and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems are Under Way, but
Key Activities Need to Be Completed (PDF) US GAO (September 2005)
Report on a Survey
of Changes in Total Annual Expenditures for Florida Counties
Before and After Purchase of Touch Screens and
a Comparison
of Total Annual Expenditures for Touch Screens and Optical Scanners.
(PDF) Myerson & Myerson, 2005.
Cost
Comparisons of Optical Scan vs. DRE Systems per County for Georgia.
Average savings to state over a 5-year-period would be over $25
million. Costs for small counties would rise and could be offset
by state
savings.
Voter-Verified
Paper Ballots are Cost Effective. Operating Cost Comparison for
Different Types of Voting Systems in North Carolina.
Comparing Costs
of Pre-Election Testing for Opscan and DRE Systems.
(PDF) John Washburn, Certified Software Engineer.
V. Pre-election (Logic & Accuracy)
Testing
The Need for Robust Pre-Election
Testing (PDF)
VotersUnite!
Ballot Definitions Files.
No Review is Provided for a Key Component of Voting System Software. (PDF) Ellen Theisen, VotersUnite!,
October 2005.
5 Simple Rules for
Testing Your Voting Machinery (PDF)
John Washburn, Certified Software Quality Engineer, August 2006
Guidelines for Creating
a Deck of Test Ballots (PDF)
John Washburn, Certified Software Quality Engineer, September
2006
Douglas W. Jones on Testing Voting Systems
VI. Audits, Recounts & Verification
Protocols
Paying
Attention: Audits, Recounts & Verification Protocols (PDF)
Warren Stewart, VoteTrust USA
Manual Audit Requirements
- examples from several states (PDF)
Verified Voting Foundation, November 2006
Electronic Vote Counting:
Where Did We Go Wrong? (PDF)
Howard Stanislevic, VoteTrustUSA E-Vote Education Project
November 2006
Random Auditing
of E-Voting Systems: How Much is Enough? (PDF)
Howard Stanislevic, Research Consultant to VoteTrustUSA, August
2006
Stanislevic's
Online Audit Calculator Read at least one of the
two articles from Stanislevic immediately above before you
try
the calculator.
Effective Use of Computing Technology in Vote-Tallying (PDF)
Roy G. Saltman, NIST, 1975
On Estimating the Size of a Statistical Audit (PDF)
Ronald L. Rivest, MIT, November 2006
VII. Openness & Transparency
Making Democracy Transparent
by David Dill, Founder, Verified Voting Foundation. (3/2006)
Open Source Software…
IX. Independent Evaluation of the Conduct of Indiana Elections
Proposal to Indiana Secretary
of State submitted by Indiana Profs. Jean Camp and Gene Spafford (PDF)
Secretary of States' Call for Comment on Voting Equipment (PDF)
X. Voter Registration Database Issues
Making the List: Database Matching and Verification Processes
for Voter Registration (PDF) Brennan Justice Center
(2006)
Statewide Databases of Registered Voters: Study of Accuracy,
Privacy, Usability, Security and Reliability Issues.
(PDF)
Association for Computing Machinery.
XI. Pollworker Selection,
Assignment & Training
Challenges to Fair Elections: Poll Worker Training (PDF)
Demos: A Network for Ideas & Action
