Verify the 2006 Elections - Indiana
Indiana has a long way to go to ensure secure and accurate elections.
Do you wonder whether your vote counts? Are you losing faith in
our
electoral process? Do you think
our elections are as accurate as they should be? Are you concerned
that the results might be vulnerable to errors, machine failure
or fraud? “Don’t
just worry – take action!”
Inform everyone about the:
Election Protection
Hotline at
1-866-OUR-VOTE
Watch the Vote is
a national outreach campaign to encourage citizens to engage
in the most important aspect of our democratic process
- the right to vote and have that vote counted.
Are you working as a pollworker or pollwatcher? Please sign up
for Pollworkers
for Democracy -- the day after the
election we ask that you complete an online survey so we can learn
how things went. Reports from pollworkers and pollwatchers will
be entered into the Election Incident Reporting System database.
Video the Vote Starting
this election, citizen journalists—people like
you and I—will document problems as they occur. We'll play
them online, spread word through blogs and partner websites,
doing our
part to make sure the full story of our elections is told. Important:
You must learn the rules about where you can and cannot film!
You cannot film inside the polls without appropriate credentials
and you cannot film anything that would compromise a voter's
privacy as they cast their vote!
Got a cell phone? Working
Assets will text you on election day
if there's an urgent issue where your participation -- such as
a phone call
or carefully-targeted
local action -- can make a big difference.
Did you observe problems with electronic voting or electronic
poll books? The Voter Action E-Voting Hotline is set up
to collect information about these problems. Call 1-888-SAV-VOTE.
Evidence of fraud? Contact the Election
Protection Strike Force
Election Fraud Hotline 1-888-VOTETIP.
Verified Voting - Election Transparency Project
ETP is providing information and suggestions to voters who
are willing to observe all stages of our elections, ask questions,
and report back.
Audit the Election
At present, there is no Indiana law that requires automatic audits
of elections – so the only option available to citizens and
candidates to double-check that the reported election results are
accurate is recounts.
Contact
candidates and parties and encourage them to be prepared to Verify
Indiana's Vote.
Auditing the central tabulator
At the end of election day, the votes stored on voting machines
(or direct-record electronic machines or optical scan ballot
card readers) must be added together to get the election results.
This is done by putting the memory cartridge (or card) from each
machine into a reader attached to a PC at the County Clerk’s
office. The PC runs a program that adds up the votes from all
of the voting machines – the central tabulator program.
Microvote’s software is called MEMS or EMS; Diebold’s
software is called GEMS; ES&S’s software is called
Unity. Even if all of the votes are stored correctly when voters
cast their ballots, problems can occur with the central tabulator
program – as a result of a
simple programming error, a bug in the software, or an
intentional hack.
If
you live in a county with a DRE voting system: To
double-check that the central tabulators are accurately tallying
votes from the DRE voting
machines correctly, citizens should petition their local Board
of Election for copies of the summary tapes from each voting
machine and tally sheets from each precinct (where
available). In my home county, the tally sheets are completed
by pollworkers
at the end of election day by adding up votes shown on the summary
tapes of all voting machines at that precinct. The summary tapes
and tally sheets are public record of the election and any citizen
has the right to obtain copies. (Important: Ask the BOE to have
pollworkers print an additional set of summary tapes from each
voting machine at the end of election day – otherwise you
won’t get summary tapes for weeks or months after the election.)
If
you live in a county with an optical scan voting system: To
double-check that the central tabulators are accurately tallying
votes from the optical scan readers at each precinct, citizens
should
petition
their local Board of Election for copies of the summary tapes
from each reader and tally sheets from each precinct (where
available). The summary tapes are public record of the
election and any citizen has the right to petition the BOE for
copies. (Important: Ask the BOE to have pollworkers print an
additional set of summary tapes from each reader at the end of
election day – otherwise you won’t get summary tapes
for weeks or months after the election.)
What to do with your summary tapes: The results on the
tally sheets and/or the summary tapes should be entered into
a spreadsheet
(like Excel or Microsoft Access) or into statistical software
package. These totals can be compared to the totals reported
by the central tabulator PC (the computer in the County Clerk’s
office that totals the votes from all of the individual voting
machines).
Please note: Most counties in Indiana use at least two vote casting
/ vote-counting systems and that your results will only reflect
the systems you are auditing. For example: In Monroe County people
who vote absentee-by-mail vote on old-fashioned paper ballots and
those ballots are counted by hand on election day. The totals for
the absentee-by-mail voters are entered by hand into central tabulator
system. People who vote absentee-in-person at the Clerk’s
office (between October 10 and November 6) will vote on optical
scan ballot cards. The votes on the optical scan ballots are read
by a card reader attached to the central tabulator PC. People who
vote in the precincts will vote on direct-record electronic voting
machines. So, if you get the summary tapes from all of the voting
machines you will be auditing only the DRE votes. You will have
to work with the County staff to get the results for votes cast
absentee-by-mail and for votes cast absentee-in-person at the Clerk’s
office.
Auditing voter-verified paper ballots
Citizens can petition their local Boards of Election to
allow manual random audits of
voter-verified paper ballots (such as optical scan ballots). Volunteers would hand count paper ballots from randomly-selected
precincts to check the accuracy of the machine count.
From the Brennan Report (pp. 87 – 88): "The very first security
recommendation made by the Brennan Center is to conduct automatic
random audits of voter-verified
paper ballots. A small percentage of all voter-verified paper
ballots should be audited to determine that the optical scan reader
tallied the votes
correctly. The samples to be audited should be selected in a random
and transparent way. In Monroe County, people who vote absentee
or vote early,
are not physically in their precinct when voting, but their ballot
is marked with a precinct identifier that determines how the optical
scanner reads their ballot. Precincts could be selected for audits
if ballots are sorted by precinct before or after they are scanned.
Ideally, one precinct would be selected from each set of precincts
using a unique ballot style. The assignment of volunteer audit
teams should occur immediately before the audits. The audits should
take place by 9 a.m. the day
after Election Day.The audit should include a tally of spoiled
ballots (in the case of VVPB cancellations), overvotes, and undervotes."
Verified Voting on Manual Audit Requirements
Random Auditing of E-Voting Systems: How Much Is Enough?
Conduct independent
exit polls
A team, led by someone with expertise in survey methods, could conduct exit polls
on election day and/or conduct phone polls on the day after the election. Exit
polls conducted on election day would be expected to match the results from the
voting machines used on election day (within the margin of error). A phone poll
the day after election day would reveal more about votes cast early and votes
cast on election day.
Check out the Election Defense
Alliance to learn how to conduct your own exit polls.
Conduct parallel elections
A team of volunteers strategically selects precincts, and sets
up a table outside the precinct (at an appropriate distance).
Voters who wish to participate cast their vote for a selected
race at your table – signing
an affidavit attesting that the vote they cast at the table is
the
same one that they cast inside. Parallel elections results should
roughly reflect the election day results for that precinct. Parallel
elections are also a good way to catalog voter concerns.
Citizens Audit Parallel Elections
Parallel Elections: How To Do Them (Video)
The Parallel Elections Project
Plan
B: Parallel Elections & Signed Ballots
First “Grass Roots” Parallel
Election Project
